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VOLUME 11

1967

NUMBER 1

As we proceed further into the second half of the Twentieth
Century, rapid changes are occurring in all aspects of our society.
Even the honorable and ancient laws of marriage are not immutable.
Professor Rames, in a series of articles which will culminate in a proposed act, reviews, criticizes and suggests revision of the Wyoming
marriage statutes. Specifically, in Part I the author discusses in detail
twenty-one sections of the Wyoming statutes concerning the creation
of the marriage relationship. Professor Rames' analysis of these sections
progresses from a discussion of their present apparent meaning to a
recommended meaning which will be incorporated into a proposed act.

AN ANALYSIS OF WYOMING MARRIAGE
STATUTES, WITH SOME SUGGESTIONS
FOR REFORM--PART I
John 0. Rames*
INTRODUCTORY

M

OST of the Wyoming statutes dealing directly with the

subject of marriage appear as Sections 20-1 to 20-21
of the current compilation. Many of these 21 sections were
enacted during Territorial days and have been brought forward unchanged from the Compiled Laws of 1876. This
observation is not intended as a criticism, per se, since marriage is an ancient and honorable institution the outward
forms of which have not changed much through the years.
However, the existing marriage statutes are unsatisfactory
in numerous important respects; it will be the object of this
series of articles to point out deficiencies and to make specific
suggestions for legislative correction.
The changes which will be suggested relate to
and substance. There is a need for clarification of
ing of some of the existing statutes; the statutes
supplemented in certain respects; and some of
obsolete or obsolescent in the light of modern legal
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logical ideas. Other states have recognized the need for
revision of their marriage statutes; the most recent complete
revision is the Wisconsin "Family Code," enacted by the
legislature of that state in 1961. California is in the process
of modernizing its domestic relations statutes; a proposed
revision was partially enacted into law by the 1965 legislature
in California, and the remainder is now receiving serious
study and consideration.
We shall first analyze, in order, Sections 20-1 to 20-21,
after which all other statutes directly pertaining to marriage
will be considered. The object of the analysis is to point out
defects and to identify problems; solutions will be offered
at this stage only incidentally, as where a problem is identified
through pointing out how other states have handled the particular point in a manner different from Wyoming. After
having analyzed our marriage statutes we will undertake to
suggest changes which seem desirable.
ANALYsIs OF SECTIONS

20-1

TO

20-21

Section 20-1 provides that "In law, marriage is considered a civil contract, to which the consent of the parties capable
of contracting is essential." This is the truth, although it is
not the whole truth. Marriage has certain aspects of a commercial contract, and among them is the necessity of valid
consent by parties capable of contracting. In other respects,
e.g., the lack of legal power to agree to its modification or
termination, the contract of marriage differs from a commercial contract. It seems unnecessary to specify in a statute
the respects in which the contract of marriage is similar to,
and the respects in which it differs from, an ordinary commercial contract. It is certainly allowable, even desirable, for
the legislature to emphasize (as it did in Section 20-1) the
necessity of valid consent by parties legally capable of giving
it, and that in the eyes of the law marriage is a civil contract
rather than, for example, a religious sacrament.
Nowhere does the statutory law of Wyoming declare
that so-called common-law marriages formed in Wyoming are
invalid. We might conclude from a reading of Section 20-1
as it now stands that, by implication, common-law marriages
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol2/iss1/9
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contracted in Wyoming are valid, since the emphasis is on
the consensual nature of marriage. Such a contention was
evidently made In re Robert's Estate;1 Justice Blume, who
wrote the opinion in that case, in rejecting such an approach
said,2 with reference to Section 20-1, "Too much stress should
not be laid upon the first section of the act alone." The court
in the Robert's Estate case and in the companion case of In
re Reeves' Estate,' held that common-law marriages entered
into in Wyoming are invalid. Although it is unlikely that
the Wyoming Supreme Court will depart from its holdings
in the Robert's Estate and Reeves' Estate cases, it would be
sound practice to codify those holdings. The logical way in
which to do so would be by adding language to that effect
to existing Section 20-1. Such language will be found in the
proposed legislation to be set out in the conclusion in this
series of articles.
Furthermore, it would be well to specify in Section 20-1
which provisions of our marriage statutes are to be considered
mandatory, so that compliance with them would be essential
to a valid marriage, and which are directory only, with the
result that non-compliance would not affect the validity of
the marriage at all or at worst would render it voidable. We
know that common-law marriages entered into in Wyoming
are void, and we know from reading Sections 20-1 to 20-21
what the numerous requirements are for ceremonial marriages, but (with a few exceptions such as Section 20-33) the
statutes do not delineate the status of marriages in which
some, but not all, of the ceremonial marriage requirements
were for some reason not followed. These uncertainties should
be remedied.
To illustrate, in Connors v. Connors,4 a marriage license
had been issued and a proper marriage ceremony performed,
but the marriage certificate had not subsequently been recorded as required by what is now Section 20-13. The court held
the statutory requirement, that the county clerk "shall record
all such returns," to be directory only despite the use of the
1.
2.
3.
4.

58 Wyo. 438, 133 P.2d 492 (1943).
Id. at 500.
58 Wyo. 432, 133 P.2d 503 (1943).
5 Wyo. 433, 40 Pac. 966 (1895).
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word "shall." It added, by way of dictum,' that the marriage
would have been valid" whether any license was obtained from
the county clerk or not." According to this dictum, the statutes requiring an application for and issuance of a license
would be merely directory. All this points up the desirability
of a legislative declaration along the lines indicated in the
preceding paragraph. Many rights and liabilities depend
upon the validity of marriages, hence it is desixable that our
"marriage code" be as specific as possible with respect to
what must take place in order to constitute a valid marriage,
and what the status of the union is in the event that a requirement is not met.
A later case, In re Trent's Claim,6 regarded the Robert's
Estate case as holding that the requirement of obtaining a
license is mandatory, thus repudiating the Connors dictum.
In the Robert's Estate case the court referred to the mandatory-directory problem, noting that there is a distinction
between marriages which are void because of total
absence of compliance with the statutes, and marriages in connection with which some irregularity
merely appears .... In many instances some statutory provisions may be mandatory, and others, on the
same subject, may be directory. A result which is
reasonable is sought.7
Enough has been said to indicate the desirability of a
legislative declaration in this regard. Working toward that
end, we may first note that Sections 20-1 to 20-21 impose the
following requirements or conditions for ceremonial marriages performed in Wyoming :'
(1) Minimum marriageable ages [20-2];
(2) Parent's consent to marriage of minors [20-3];
(3)

Application for a license [20-5];

(4) Issuance of license [20-4];
(5) Health certificate, report of serological test, etc.
[20-7];
5.
6.
7.
8.

ibid.
68 Wyo. 146, 231 P.2d 180 (1951).
In re Robert's Estate, supra note 1, at 459-60, 133 P.2d at 499.
The numbers in brackets are section numbers. For convenience these
requirements or conditions will be referred to as "requirements" only.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol2/iss1/9
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(6) Performance of a ceremony by an authorized celebrant [20-10] ;
(7) Minimum formalities for the ceremony [20-11]; or
(8) Marriage in accordance With the rites and customs
of a religious society to which the parties belong
[20-20];
(9) Certificate of marriage, issued "on request" by the
celebrant [20-12] ;
(10) Recording of "returns" of marriages by county
clerk [20-13].
Which of these requirements were intended to be mandatory, and which were intended to be directory only ? If the
latter, what is the result of non-compliance: will the marriage
be voidable, or will it be completely valid? The statutory
language may provide some guide, and there are Supreme
Court decisions settling these questions as to a few of the
ten requirements just enumerated.
Respecting language, words such as "must" and "shall"
are normally mandatory in character. We find such words
with respect to requirements (1),1" (3),11 (4),12 (5),1" (7),14
and (10) ;15 however, the situation concerning requirements

(9) and (10) is somewhat uncertain. Section 20-12 does not
require that in all cases the person solemnizing the marriage
shall or must issue a marriage certificate, but only that he
do so "on request" of the parties. A hiatus exists between
this section and the succeeding section 20-13 which provides
that "The county clerk . . . shall record all such returns of
marriages in a book to be kept for that purpose .... ." In

actual practice, the celebrant issues marriage certificates to
both parties in all cases and executes and returns an additional marriage certificate to the county clerk in all cases."0
The county clerk enters the facts pertaining to the marriage
82 C.J.S. Statutes § 380 (1953).
the male must be of the age of eighteen years ..
"...
"Application for a marriage license shall be made .... .
". .. a license . . . must be obtained ......
"Every male and female person securing a marriage license must produce
a certificate . .. ."
14. ". . . the parties shall solemnly declare ..
15. "The county clerk ... shall record all such returns .. .
16. Personal interview with Rev. Otis Jackson, Dean of St. Matthews (Episcopal) Cathedral, Laramie, Wyoming, on August 23, 1966.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
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in a "marriage book," endorses the marriage certificate, and
sends it to the Division of Vital Statistics of the Wyoming
Department of Public Health'-an excellent method of making marriages matters of public record, but to some extent
extra-statutory. The statutes should be clarified so as to
reflect what is 'done in actual practice. If this is done, mandatory language should be retained in expressing requirement
(9), and the "on request" phrase should be deleted.
Turning now to Supreme Court decisions, it has already
5 held that requirement
been observed that Connorsv. Connors"
(10) is directory, and that In re Robert's Estate," as interpreted by In re Trent's Claim,2" determined that requirement
(4) is mandatory. Logically, no license should be issued
unless a proper application therefore has previously been
made; without the application the county clerk could not
know whether the parties were entitled to a license. Thus,
if the license is mandatory the application should be equally
so, hence requirement (3) should be considered mandatory.
Research has not disclosed any Supreme Court decisions
throwing light on the mandatory-directory problem with
respect to requirements (1), (2), (5), (6), (7), (8) and (9).
Each of these will now be analyzed in terms of statutory
language and evaluation by authority construing similar
requirements outside Wyoming.
Requirement (1): Minimum marriageable ages [20-2].
Language of a mandatory character is used in this statute;
the male must be of the age of 18 or upwards, and the female
of the age of 16 or upwards. In this instance, however, the
word "must" cannot be interpreted as mandatory because
Sections 20-33 to 20-35 recognize "under-age" marriages as
voidable. Accordingly, the use of the word "must" in Section
20-2 is misleading and undesirable. This section is closely
connected with the succeeding Section 20-3, which expresses
requirement (2) re parent's consent to marriages of minors.
The two may well be combined, since both relate to the age
Personal interview with Miss Minnie Pearson, County Clerk of Albany
County, Wyoming, on August 23, 1966. See also Wyo. STAT. § 35-72 (1957).
18. Connors v. Connors, eupra note 4.
19. In re Robert's Estate, supra note 1.
20. In re Trent's Claim, supra note 6.
17.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol2/iss1/9
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factor. It would then be well to consider the nature of
requirement (2) before arriving at a decision involving a
re-wording of Section 20-2. Is the requirement of parent's
consent to the marriage of a minor mandatory, or is it only
directory ? If the latter, what is the effect of non-compliance
on the marriagel
In 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 23, at 855 (1948) it is stated:
Although the rule was otherwise at common law,
frequently by statute provision is made for
the consent of parents or guardians as a preliminary to the marriages of infants. As a general
rule, however, unless the statute declares a marriage
contracted without the prescribed consent to be a
nullity, it is construed as only 'directory in this
respect, so that such a marriage is valid where the
essentials of a valid marriage otherwise exist,
although disobedience of the statute may entail penalties, as, for example, where the statute provides
for or requires the consent of parents or guardian
before the issuance of a license to marry to persons
under a specified age or before the solemnization
of a marriage between such persons, and imposes a
penalty for disobedience of the statute.
In support of this statement as to the directory character of
the requirement, cases are cited from lower federal courts,
California, the District of Columbia, Illinois, New Jersey,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas and Virginia.
Similarly, the annotator in 61 A.L.R.2d 847, 859-60 (1958)
states:
The largest group of cases involving wrongfully
obtained marriage licenses dealt with the situation
where licenses have been issued to minors who made
false representations as to age, not being entitled
to marry without parental consent. These cases generally hold that if the minor is of marriageable age,
the fact that the license was procured by such false
representations does not invalidate the marriage in
the absence of a statutory declaration expressly
nullifying a marriage contracted without the requisite parental consent.
In addition to the jurisdictions listed by the C.J.S. writer,
the annotator in A.L.R.2d lists Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho,
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1967
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Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska,
New York, North Carolina, Washington, West Virginia and
Wisconsin. It will be noted that in C.J.S. it is stated that
such marriages are valid, while the A.L.R.2d statement could
include voidable as well as valid marriages.
The Wyoming statute, Section 20-3, does not expressly
declare that marriages are void where parental consent is
required but is not obtained; it merely provides that "no
license shall be granted" without such consent. The failure
to produce a parental consent when one is required is not
expressly made criminal, as are numerous other failures to
comply with the marriage statutes, e.g., Sections 20-9 and
20-15. However, an applicant who falsely represents his age
in the application, so that parental consent appears unnecessary, would probably be guilty of perjury since the application is made under oath.
All in all, it would seem sensible to take the position
that the failure to produce parental consent when one is
required should render a marriage voidable in Wyoming.
Such a position would harmonize with Sections 20-33 to
20-35. These last mentioned statutes provide that under-age
marriages (male under 18, female under 16, or both) may
be annulled, and are therefore voidable. Section 20-35 expressly gives parents power to bring such annulment suits.
By a parity of reasoning, a parent whose consent was required
but was not validly obtained to the marriage of a minor over
the marriageable age should be given power to seek annulment
of such a marriage. This could be done by expanding the
language of Section 20-35. Such a result should be an acceptable compromise between declaring the marriage void because
of the lack of parental consent (which seems too harsh) and
'declaring it completely valid and thus in practical effect
emasculating the requirement of parental consent.
A few jurisdictions seem to have taken this position."'
Turner v. Turner22 will serve as a good illustration. In this
21. Turner v. Turner, 167 Cal. App. 2d 636, 334 P.2d 1011 (1959); Matturo
v. Matturo, 117 N.Y.S.2d 523 (1952) ; Lyndon v. Lyndon, 69 Ill. 43 (1873);
Robertson v. Cole, 12 Tex. 356 (1854). More recent Illinois and Texas
cases appear to hold that the marriage is completely valid.
22. Turner v. Turner, supra note 21.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol2/iss1/9
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case, a father brought suit to have his written consent to the
marriage of a son then under 18 years of age cancelled, on
the ground of fraud, and to have the marriage annulled. The
District Court of Appeal granted the relief sought. Apparently the case went no further. The plaintiff's son and a young
woman represented that they had already been married in
Mexico, that she was pregnant, and that the son was the
father of her unborn child. Through these representations
they induced the father to consent to a California marriage.
In fact they had not been married in Mexico, and the girl's
pregnancy was by another man. The court found the representations materially false, decreed cancellation of the consent, and granted annulment under a statute expressly giving
a parent the right to obtain an annulment of a marriage of
a minor child who for any reason was incapable of validly
consenting to marry. (Another statute provided that a male
under 18 was not capable of validly consenting, unless his
parent also consented.) In holding the marriage voidable,
and therefore subject to annulment, the court expressed the
following philosophy :"
Since the consent to the marriage was obtained by
fraud, the marriage is voidable. [citing California
cases] ...
The purpose of a statute providing that a marriage
license shall not be issued to a person under age
without the consent of a parent is to permit the
parent to exercise control and discipline over a child
until marriage and to that end prevent him, if possible, from contracting an ill-advised marriage.
Lundstrom v. Mample, 205 Minn. 91, 285 N.W. 83, 84.
The father and mother of a legitimate unmarried
minor child are entitled to its custody, services and
earnings. Civ. Code, § 197. The right of a fit and
proper parent to his child's custody is somewhat in
the nature of a property right, and is paramount, in
a sense, to the child's theoretical welfare and best
interests ....

The parents are the natural guardians

of their child, and are responsible to the state for
the child's well-being. 37 Cal. Jur. 2d 145, § 7. The
parent has authority to control the child, and to
administer restraint and punishment, in order to
23. Id., 384 P.2d at 1014-15.
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compel obedience to reasonable and necessary direcThe authority of a parent ceases on the
tions ....
marriage of a child. Civ. Code, § 204.
A marriage entered into by a male under the age
of 18 years without the written consent of one of
his parents is subject to annulment at the instance
of his parent. [citing cases.]
The court then discussed with approval the case of Vaughan
v. Gideon " which it characterized as being "squarely in
point." By way of dictum the Turner opinion pointed out
that under California law the annulment would not bastardize
a child which had been born after the marriage.
As a matter of fact the Vaughan case is not squarely in
point, because in that case the minor was below the minimum
marriageable age, which in and of itself would render the
marriage voidable and subject to annulment. Under those
circumstances it is really immaterial whether the parent consents or not. There are many such cases.
It is reassuring to note that a well-known authority in
the field of Domestic Relations, in drafting a proposed model
act on annulment, adopted the position here urged.2" Section
12(A) of Professor Vernon's model act reads as follows:
A marriage is annulable if, at the time of the
marriage, the male party is eighteen, nineteen or
twenty years old or the female party is sixteen or
seventeen years old, unless consent to the marriage
is given by a parent, guardian or persons in charge
of the underage party.2"
The minimum
Vernon are 18
are annulable
party is below

marriageable ages suggested by Professor
for males and 16 for females, and marriages
regardless of parental consent when either
minimum marriageable age, as in Wyoming.

Returning, at last, from the long excursion upon which
we have embarked, what have we concluded as to the mandatory character of requirements (1) re minimum marriageable
24. 56 Cal. App. 2d 158, 132 P.2d 529 (1942).
25. Vernon, Annulment of Marriage:A Proposed Model Act, 12 J. PUB. L. 143,
180 (1963). The author, David H. Vernon, was then Associate Professor
of Law at the University of New Mexico School of Law.
26. Id., § 13(A), at 181.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol2/iss1/9
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ages, found in Section 20-2 and (2) re parental consent, found
in Section 20-3 ? We have concluded (a) that the word "must"
is misleading and should be changed, since it is not mandatory
that the male be at least 18 years old and the female at least
16; (b) that, similarly, Section 20-3 requiring parental consent to the marriage of a minor should not be considered mandatory; and (c) that the absence of parental consent, where
one is required, should make the marriage annulable at the
suit of the parent (only) in like manner and with like effect
as in the case of under-age marriages. In the light of these
conclusions, Section 20-3 should be combined with Section
20-2, and Sections 20-33 to 20-35 should be amplified to
include lack of parental consent as a ground for annulment
by parent.
Requirement (2): Parent's consent to marriage of minors
[20-3], we have just disposed of.
Requirement (5) : Health certificate, report of serological
test, etc. [20-7]. Language of a mandatory character is used
in this statute: persons securing a marriage license must
produce a certificate of freedom from venereal disease in communicable form; the certificate shall include or be accompanied by a report of a serological test for syphilis and by
a report of laboratory examination for other venereal disease
indicated by the physical examination. Most jurisdictions
have held that statutory requirements for serological tests
(as we shall call these requirements for the sake of brevity)
are directory only, even if couched in mandatory language,
and that the marriage is valid, or at worst voidable, when the
requirements have not been met. 7 Christensen v. Christensen28 is perhaps typical of the majority decisions. There, the
Supreme Court of Nebraska held the marriage voidable, saying with reference to the Nebraska statute:
While the purpose and intent of the provisions relied
upon . . . was undoubtedly to protect the innocent,
prevent the spread of infectious social disease, and
27. Woodward Iron Co. v. Dean, 217 Ala. 530, 117 So. 52 (1928); Boysen v.
Boysen, 301 111. App. 573, 23 N.E.2d 231 (1939); Christensen v. Christensen,
144 Neb. 763, 14 N.W.2d 613 (1944); Heller v. Heller, 68 N.Y.S.2d 545
(1947) ; Berenson v. Berenson, 98 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1950) ; Lyannes v. Lyannes,
171 Wis. 381, 177 N.W. 683 (1920). Contra (requirement mandatory, marriage void if not observed) Fisher v. Sweet & McLain, 154 Pa. Super. 216,
35 A.2d 756 (1944) (dictum). Annot., 127 A.L.R. 421, 427 (1940).
28. Christensen v. Christensen, supra note 27.
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safeguard posterity, we find no provision in the
statutes of this state applicable here which expressly
declares that a marriage by such a person is void ....
In the absence of express statutory invalidation, this
court has held that the fact that the license required
was wrongfully or fraudulently procured may subject
the parties to the pains and penalties of the law for
violation thereof, but it does not alone affect the
validity of the marriage itself. [citing cases] . . .
We decide that the marriage in the case at bar is
29
voidable only ...
As with some of the other requirements, the question
arises whether the failure to comply with the serological test
requirements should make the marriage voidable, or whether
it should be considered entirely valid. The latter position
would virtually rob the statute of all practical effect; it would
leave an innocent party with no remedy except the possible
one of annulment for fraud (which will be discussed later),
and would defeat the object of the statute, which is to insure
healthy marriages and healthy offspring so far as venereal
disease is concerned. As with the parental consent requirement, to declare the marriage void for failure to obtain the
health certificate seems for obvious reasons too harsh. It
therefore seems desirable that the marriage be considered
voidable, and that this be expressly provided by statute.
Requirement (6): Performance of a ceremony by an
authorized celebrant [20-10]. The language used in this
statute is permissive in nature rather than mandatory: judges,
court commissioners, justices of the peace and ministers of
the gospel may perform the marriage ceremony. This statute,
together with Section 20-11 relating to the form of the ceremony, is fleshed out by Section 20-20 which provides that
marriages performed according to the rites and customs of
"any religious society" shall be ]awful, i.e., valid. We must
also take into account that portion of Section 20-11 which
provides that at the ceremony the parties must make certain
affirmations "in the presence of the person performing the
ceremony." Even though the word "may" is used in Section
20-10, logic dictates that (except as may be modified by Section 20-20) there must be a person performing a ceremony,
29. Id., 14 N.W.2d at 615-16.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol2/iss1/9
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and that only such persons as are specified in Section 20-10
may lawfully perform a marriage ceremony. So, in Section
20-10 we have a permissive word, "may," which should be
construed to have a mandatory effect-the antithesis of Sections 20-3 and 20-7, where words of a mandatory nature should
be construed to have a directory meaning! Surely the sine
qua non of a "ceremonial marriage," as contrasted with a
common-law or consensual marriage, is that there shall be a
ceremony, performed by one of a specified class of persons.
There seems to be a dearth of authority stating that the
performance of a ceremony is essential to a ceremonial marriage: perhaps a statement to that effect would be reductio ad
absurdum. However, the whole thrust of the In re Robert's
Estate opinion"0 is to this effect. Justice Blume referred with
approval to a federal decision which construed a statute very
similar to our Section 20-11; he said of this decision:
The court stated that the section was strongly indicative of the mandatory nature of the marriage laws.
Our present statute ...

is similar ....

The phrase

"and in any case there shall be at least two witnesses
beside the minister or magistrate present at the ceremony," leaves little room for construction. To hold
that in spite of this, no witnesses and no minister
and no magistrate need be present, and that a simple
contract between the parties suffices

would seem

to be the merest mockery."
There may be some doubt whether the classes of persons
authorized by Section 20-10 to perform marriages (the celebrants) are exclusive. It is said in American Jurisprudence:
An act which merely provides that certain persons
may solemnize marriages does not prevent the
solemnization by others in the absence of positive
statutory enactment, and this has been held to be
true even though the statute declares that no other
person or persons should solemnize marriages, except those mentioned in it.
...

Performance of a marriage ceremony by an un-

authorized person 'does not generally render a marriage invalid."2
80. In re Robert's Estate, supra note 1.
81. Id. at 462-63, 133 P.2d at 500-01.
32. 35 AM. Jml. Marriage § 26, at 197 (1941).
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Several old cases are cited in support of these statements. 3
In all of these cases the basis of decision was that since
common-law marriages were valid in the jurisdiction, it was
immaterial whether the celebrant (and in some of the cases
there was no celebrant) was or was not within the classes
of persons authorized by the statute to perform marriage
ceremonies. Against this background the American Jurisprudence statement should not be viewed as supporting the
proposition that the authorization of certain persons to perform marriages is not exclusive or mandatory. In any event,
the Wyoming statute should make it clear that a marriage
ceremony is mandatory, and that it can be validly performed
only by those authorized in the statute to act as celebrants.
Section 20-20 (marriage according to the rites and customs
of religious societies) and Section 20-16 (want of jurisdiction
or authority of justice of the peace or minister) would not
be affected, and would continue to mitigate the severity of
Sections 20-10 and 20-11.
Requirement (7) : Minimum formalities for the ceremony
[20-11]. There is language in this statute which is mandatory
in nature; the parties shall solemnly declare in the presence
of the celebrant and the attending witnesses that they take
each other as husband and wife, and there shall be at least
two witnesses. What we have said about the preceding requirement, represented by Section 20-10, applies in large
part also to Section 20-11: a ceremony of some kind is the
very heart of ceremonial marriage. Section 20-11 specifies
certain minimum requirements for the ceremony, and to that
limited extent should be considered mandatory.
Requirement (8) : Marriage in accordance with the rites
and customs of a religious society to which the parties belong
[20-20]. By its very nature this requirement is permissive
rather than mandatory.
Requirement (9): Certificate of marriage, issued "on
request" by the celebrant [20-12]. As it now stands this
requirement seems to be 'directory only, since the certificate
83. Farley v. Farley, 94 Ala. 501, 10 So. 646 (1892); Dyer v. Bannock, 66 Mo.
391 (1877) ; State v. Zichfeld, 23 Nev. 304, 46 Pac. 802 (1896) ; Londonderry v. Chester, 2 N.H. 268 (1820).
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is given only on request; nonetheless, the next succeeding
Section 20-13 requires the county clerk to record "all such
returns of such marriages," which implies that after all marriage ceremonies the celebrant must execute a marriage certificate and transmit it to the county clerk, whether or not
the parties have requested such certificate. What is now
implied should be made explicit in Section 20-12. The requirement should not be mandatory, since a marriage certificate is only evidence that a marriage was performed and not
part of the ceremony or the prerequisites to the ceremony.
Moreover, the parties to the marriage have no way of controlling the actions of the celebrant or those of the county
clerk with respect to the marriage certificate, hence it would
be unjust if the validity of the marriage were affected by
their derelictions. And finally, if the recording of a marriage
certificate is only a directory requirement, as held in the
Connors case,3 4 the issuance of such a certificate by the celebrant should not be regarded as of greater importance.
This conclusion seems to be in accord with authority. The
writer in American Jurisprudencestates that:
Statutes relating to the solemnization of marriages
usually provide for the issuance of a certificate of
marriage and for the registration or recording of
marriages .... Generally speaking, the registration
or recording of a marriage is not essential to its
validity, the statute being addressed to the officials
issuing the license, certifying the marriage, and making the proper return and registration or recording."
And in Corpus Juris Secundum it is stated that "a failure
or deficiency in the return or record does not affect the
validity of the marriage .. . .
No decisions contra to these statements could be found.
A fairly recent case supporting them is Rea v. Fornan," an
Ohio case interpreting the marriage statutes of Arizona,
where the court in a dictum made the following observations
respecting those statutes:
34.
35.
36.
37.

Connors v. Connors, supra note 4.
35 AM. JiU. Marriage § 27, at 197-98 (1941).
55 C.J.S. Marriage § 33, at 865 (1948).
46 N.E.2d 649 (Ohio), rehearing denied, 46 N.E.2d 664 (1942), appeal
dismissed, 140 Ohio St. 546, 45 N.E.2d 600 (1942), cert. denied, 320 U.S.
774 (1943).
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It is also a requirement that the individual performing the ceremony shall have the contracting
parties sign at the proper place and he shall certify
the fact of their marriage and return the certificate
to the clerk's office where it shall be recorded in a
permanent record.
While the different sections of the Arizona Code
provide much detail in the interest of having and
preserving records, yet, as we view it, the only
thing essential to constitute a ceremonial marriage
was the issuing of a license to the contracting parties
and the performing of the ceremony by a designated
person under the statute. While the performance of
all the ministerial duties would be important to all
couples marrying in the state, yet the failure to
perform mere ministerial duties would not void a
ceremonial marriage if, in fact, it was duly performed."
Other cases with holdings to the same effect are cited
in the footnote.3 9 It seems evident that the execution and
delivery of the marriage certificate to the parties by the
celebrant should be considered directory only. This position
would be in harmony with the Connors case,"' holding that
Requirement (10), recording of returns of marriages by the
County Clerk, is merely directory.
This completes the analysis of the ten requirements for
ceremonial marriages set out in Sections 20-1 to 20-21 of the
Wyoming statutes, with respect to whether each is (or should
be considered) mandatory, or directory only. Including the
construction placed by the Supreme Court of Wyoming on
requirements (4) and (10), we have reached the conclusion
that the only mandatory requirements should be numbers
(3), application for a marriage license, (4) issuance of a
license, (6) performance of a ceremony by an authorized celebrant, and (7), minimum formalities required at the ceremony. The remaining six requirements would be directory.
Of these, non-compliance with requirements (1), minimum
marriageable ages, (2), parent's consent to marriage of
minors, and (5), health certificate, serological test, etc., would
38. Id., 46 N.E.2d at 655.
39. McDonald v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 73 F. Supp. 198 (W.D. La. 1947);
Reynolds v. Coles, 83 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1948).
40. Connors v. Connors, eupra note 4.
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render the marriage voidable; non-compliance with requirements (8), marriage in accordance with the rites and customs
of a religious society, (9), certificate of marriage issued by
the celebrant, and (10), recording of marriage certificate by
county clerk, would not affect the validity of the marriage
at all. Changes in statutory provisions necessary to implement
these conclusions have been incorporated in the proposed
legislation set out at the end of this article.
Having laid the mandatory-directory problem to rest,
let us return to further analysis of Sections 20-1 to 20-21.
Enough has been said for the moment about Sections 20-1
and 20-2. The parental consent statute, Section 20-3, could
be improved. The term "minor" has not been defined by
a statute of general applicability in Wyoming, and presuamably
the common law definition would apply: "a person who has
not reached the age, usually twenty-one years, at which the
law recognizes a general contractual capacity."'" But the
Wyoming legislature provided in 1943 that "Minors above
the age of nineteen years, where it shall appear to their
material advantage, may have their disabilities of minority
removed and be thereafter held for all legal purposes of full
age, except as to the right to vote." 2 And we know that
minors may be emancipated in various other ways."3 In order
to avoid problems of interpretation of the term "minor" as
used in Section 20-3, it would be well to substitute the term
"uider twenty-one years of age."
Secondly, the giving of a verbal consent by a parent, as
authorized by Section 20-3, invites trouble. In actual practice,
as indicated by the printed form of application for marriage
license, the county clerk obtains the written consent of a
parent of a minor. It is therefore suggested that the language
permitting verbal consents be deleted, and that written consents be obtained whether the parent is present when the
license is applied for, or absent.
As a matter of policy, should the consent of both parents
be required? The legislature seems to have answered the
41.

BALLENTINE, LAW DICTIONARY 820 (2nd ed. 1948).

42. WYO. STAT. § 14-1 (1957).
43. For example, marriage ordinarily effects emancipation of a minor. See 67
C.J.S. Parent and Child § 89(c), at 816 (1950).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1967

17

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 2 [1967], Iss. 1, Art. 9
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

V oi.

HI

question in the negative, and this decision seems wise; in
many instances parents may not agree on this subject. The
purpose of the statute is to provide a check on impetuous and
ill-advised youthful marriages, and if at least one parent is
willing to consent this purpose will have been served. Since
the father normally carries the primary financial burden of
support of his children, it seems fair enough to leave the
decision to him.
What if the father has deserted his family and is presumably living but cannot be located? What if the parents
are divorced, and the minor child who wishes to be married
is in the legal custody of the mother? There is an ambiguity
in the meaning of the statute as applied to such situations.
Read one way, if the father is living he alone can consent.
Read another way, the guardian or person, under whose care
and government such minor may be, can consent, regardless
of whether the father is living. This should be clarified. We
suggest the utilization of a procedure connected with the
"gin marriage law" which the legislature set up in 1931 and
later repealed: an order by a district judge when an exception seems 'desirable.44 The pertinent portion of the statute
would then read:
the written consent of the father, if living; provided, however, that the judge of the district court
of the county in which the application for the marriage license is made may, upon a finding of special
circumstances, direct the county clerk by order in
writing to accept the written consent of some person
other than the father. If the father is not living,
then the county clerk shall before issuing the license
obtain the written consent of the mother, guardian,
or other person whose care and government the applicant under twenty-one years of age may be.
Some further observations with respect to the parental
consent statute: Section 20-3 requires that the written consent
"shall be proved by the testimony of at least one competent
witness." The word "testimony" imports the presence of an
oath, and there seems no reason why the witness should sign
under oath when no oath is required of the consenting parent.
44.

See Wyo. REv. STAT. §§ 68-106 J1931).
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But more than that, little or nothing is gained by requiring
that the parent have his signature witnessed by some other
unidentified person, and the requirement should therefore be
eliminated entirely. It would make much better sense simply
to require the parental consent to be made in writing and
under oath, and such a requirement will be added in the proposed revision of Section 20-3. Ideally, some proof of parentage should be required, but this would present so many difficulties as to be impractical. A criminal penalty for submitting
a fraudulent parental consent might not be of great deterrent
value, but seems about the most that can be done under the
circumstances.
Section 20-4, requiring a marriage license, is a brief, onesentence statute which seems to be very well expressed. To
allow the applicants to apply for a license anywhere in the
state may tend to encourage elopements and secret marriages
but is 'desirable where both parties are non-residents of the
state. Some states require that the application be made in
the county of residence of one of the parties, if one or both
parties are residents of the state. Certainly we cannot say
that the legislative choice on this question is wrong. If the
place of making application were restricted and if the parties
desired a secret marriage, the restriction could easily be
avoided by going to another state to obtain the license and
be married, which would give rise to additional problems.
Section 20-5, covering the application for and the issuance
of the license, can be improved in a number of respects. The
overall objective of the application should be to elicit all
information necessary to enable the county clerk to determine
whether the applicants are qualified, under Wyoming law, to
be married in this state. To this end, the information should
negative the possibility that the marriage would be either void
or voidable if performed in Wyoming. The statute is presently inadequate to accomplish this objective. In addition,
information appropriate to establish the identity of the
applicants should be required. Furthermore, the burden which
Section 20-5 now places on the clerk to determine "whether
there be any legal impediment to the parties entering into
the marriage contract, according to the laws of the state
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1967
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of their residence" should be deleted so far as it pertains
to the laws of states other than Wyoming; Wyoming has no
obligation to enforce the laws of other states relating to the
qualifications of their residents to marry. We have difficulty
enough making sure that our own laws are being complied
with. County clerks usually are not lawyers. Even if they
were, it would be an intolerable burden to require them to
determine whether an applicant for a Wyoming marriage
license who resided in, say, Connecticut would be in violation
of Connecticut marriage laws if married in Wyoming. Wyoming has no marriage evasion statute, and our Supreme Court
has refused to adopt a marriage evasion policy by decision, 5
hence we are under no reciprocal duty to enforce Connecticut
marriage laws so far as Wyoming marriages of Connecticut
residents are concerned.
With some hesitation we suggest still another change in
Section 20-5: would it not be preferable to have the statute
require that both parties sign the application, under oath,
rather than (as now) peritting one party only to apply for
the license ? If we are trying to insure accuracy of information through the sanction of a perjury prosecution when false
information is given, it would obviously be preferable to
have each party swear to the information about himself. If
such a change were made both parties would have to appear
at the county clerk's office 'during a business day to sign
the application. This might be slightly inconvenient when
one party is a non-resident and plans to come to Wyoming for
a marriage ceremony to be performed on a week end or a
holiday. One way to eliminate that problem would be to
permit applications to be made by mail; but if that were done
the present modus operandi of the county clerk's office would
be considerably altered, because at present the applicant
signs the application form and it is immediately bound into
the "marriage book." The reaction of the county clerks to
45. Hoagland v. Hoagland, 27 Wyo. 178, 193 Pac. 843 (1920). In this case a
woman who resided in Wyoming had been divorced here. She then went to
Nebraska and married a second man. At the time, a Wyoming statute
forbade re-marriage in Wyoming within a year following a divorce. Nebraska had no similar statute, and the woman married in Nebraska in order
to evade the Wyoming statute, thereafter returning to Wyoming Where
she resided with her new husband. Held, the Nebraska marriage was nonetheless valid.
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the suggestion that both parties should be required to sign
the application should be sought.
The statutes of the seven Rocky Mountain states (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Utah and
Wyoming) on this subject were examined.4" Two of these
states, Idaho and Wyoming, require that only one party sign
the application, although the Idaho statute is not very clear
about it. The Utah statute does not cover the point
at all. The other states (Arizona, Colorado, Montana, and
New Mexico) require both parties to sign. It will be noted
that Section 20-5 requires that two people sign the application
under oath-the applicant and "some competent witness"which was probably thought to afford added assurance of the
truth of the statements in the application. No doubt the
"competent witness" often swears to the truth of information
which is entirely hearsay so far as he is concerned. Why not
eliminate him?
A final suggestion for modification of Section 20-5 has
to do with the problems of determining the ages of the parties
applying for the license. A good deal of falsification about
age probably goes on, especially in cases requiring parental
consent where the man is over 18 but under 21 and/or the
woman is over 16 but under 21. As the statute now stands,
the county clerk has no authority to require proof of age
and, in practice, accepts the representations of the applicants
as to ages. Since only one party need apply, the clerk often
'does not have an opportunity for on-the-spot evaluation of
the age of both applicants, which might help. Hence, Section
20-5 should empower the clerk to require proof of age.
Although it might be too drastic to require both certificates
in all cases, the Montana statute4 7 requiring each applicant
to submit "a certified copy of a birth certificate or other
uncontrovertible evidence of age" seems a fair compromise.
In Georgia the requirement is that birth certificates be furnished, or in lieu thereof the affidavits of at least two persons
46. ARIM. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-121 (1956); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 90-1-4
(1963); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-403 (1963); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 48-144
(Supp. 1965); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-1-16 (1953); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-8
(1953); WYO. STAT. § 20-5 (1957). It will be noted that the Montana and
New Mexico statutes set out the application forms verbatim.
47. MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 48-144 (Supp. 1965).
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other than the parties. 8 The Montana solution seems preferable.
As stated above, the application for the marriage license
should require information sufficient to negative the possibility that the prospective marriage would be either void or
voidable if performed in Wyoming. No attempt will presently be made to specify exactly what this information should
be, but a form of application for marriage license will be
included in the proposed legislation hereinafter set out.
PART II of this article will begin with an analysis of
Section 20-6, which details the circumstances under which
the county clerk is directed to refuse to issue marriage licenses.

48. See Maryland Cas. Co. v. Teele, 70 Ga. App. 259, 28 S.E.2d 193 (1943).
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